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Comments
A Contested Merger:
The Intersection of Class Actions and
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Lindsay R. Androskit
The conflict between mandatory arbitration clauses and class
action lawsuits is a timely issue in class action litigation. Both
private actors and businesses make wide use of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in commercial transactions. Insurance companies
adopt arbitration provisions as part of provider agreements,' em-
ployers include arbitration clauses in employment contracts,2
credit card issuers incorporate arbitration provisions into card-
holder agreements,3 and, by purchasing stocks or other securities,
consumers often agree to submit disputes to arbitration.4 In most
of these situations, the dispute resolution process is straightfor-
ward: the parties waive their rights to a judicial forum and in-
stead bring the complaint to a neutral arbitrator.5 The parties
B.S.(2) 1998, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2005,
University of Chicago.
See, for example, Weiner v Citigroup, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 6962, *4 (N D Tex 2002)
(dismissing plaintiffs claims against insurance company in favor of arbitration).
2 See, for example, Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams, 532 US 105, 109-10 (2001) (re-
quiring enforcement of mandatory arbitration clause in employment contract).
' See, for example, Roe v Gray, 165 F Supp 2d 1164, 1167 (D Colo 2001) (upholding
an arbitration clause inserted as an amendment to a credit cardholder agreement).
See, for example, Smith v American Arbitration Association, 233 F3d 502, 504 (7th
Cir 2000) (involving claim over stock purchase agreement which contained arbitration
clause).
See, for example, American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures, R-15, R-16 (2003), available online at <http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?
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trade the judiciary's extensive discovery process and elaborate
rules of evidence for the flexibility of selecting their own venue
and the confidentiality and informality of an arbitral setting.6
The situation becomes more complicated, however, when a
group of plaintiffs brings a class action proceeding pursuant to a
contract that contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Courts
currently disagree over how best to prioritize these competitive
interests.7 Under federal law, the general rule is clear: when a
plaintiff has agreed to a mandatory arbitration clause, he has
waived his right to bring a class action suit.8 Supreme Court
precedent makes an exception where a plaintiff class attempts to
bring suit under a statute that expressly provides for a type of
relief not normally available in arbitration (such as injunctive,
declaratory, or class relief).9 In response, the most prominent
United States arbitral organization has adopted a rule expanding
the scope of an arbitrator's power to encompass full statutory au-
thority.10 But even in view of these expanded arbitral powers,
state courts in Michigan and Florida have voided arbitration pro-
visions for unconscionability where the right to bring a class ac-
tion suit was expressly authorized by statute.1 These courts have
concluded that arbitration and class action suits are inherently
incompatible.12
In contrast, state courts in California and Pennsylvania have
attempted to further the goals of class proceedings while honor-
ing the federal policy favoring arbitration.13 These courts have
permitted class action suits to proceed under the authority of the
arbitral bodies. 4 In California, the courts have implemented a
JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload \LIVESITE \ Rules_Procedures \ National_International\..
\.. \focusArea\commercial\AAA235current.htm#R15> (visited Sept 27, 2003) (discussing
appointment of neutral arbitrator).
6 See Chief Justice Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J 274, 277
(1982) (discussing advantages of arbitration).
7 Consider Linda S. Mullenix, Can an Arbitrator Oversee Class-wide Relief?. 7th Cir-
cuit Rejects Plaintiffs on Class-wide Arbitration, Natl L J B8 (Aug 26, 2002); Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Ac-
tion Survive?, 42 Wm and Mary L Rev 1 (2000).
See Part I C.
See Part I D.
'o See National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure Rule 20(d), which authorizes
arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief allowed by applicable substantive law and based
on a Claim, Response, or Request properly submitted by a Party under this Code."
See Part I D.
,2 See Part I D.
See Part II.
See Keating v Superior Court, 645 P2d 1192, 1206-10 (Cal 1982) (discussing the
virtues of class-wide arbitration and remanding to the trial court); Dickler v Shearson
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"hybrid" solution, under which the court retains advisory author-
ity over the class action suit, while the arbitrator handles the
substantive claims.
15
Several authors have advocated the strategic business uses of
arbitration clauses. For example, one has recommended that
business lawyers encourage their commercial clients to take ad-
vantage of the favorable Supreme Court policy by adopting arbi-
tration clauses whenever practical.16 Another has explained how
franchisers can use arbitration clauses to force franchisees to ar-
bitrate claims individually, thus avoiding suits involving large
aggregate damage claims. 7 At the other end of the spectrum,
some scholars have taken the position that class actions and arbi-
tration clauses are not incompatible. Specifically, these authors
argue that court-ordered class-wide arbitration is a workable so-
lution, and suggest ways that courts, contracting parties, and
arbitrators can maximize efficiency in a consolidated arbitra-
tion."'
This Comment, by contrast, argues that class-wide arbitra-
tion in any context is improper. Part I discusses the adoption of
the Federal Arbitration Act 9 ("FAA") and traces its evolution in
case law. It then evaluates the opposing interpretations of Su-
preme Court precedent by district and state courts confronted
with the intersection of a class action claim and a mandatory ar-
bitration clause, first discussing those courts that interpret arbi-
tration clauses to constitute a waiver of class remedies (except
where expressly provided by statute), and ending with the hybrid
arbitration-litigation approach favored by California and Penn-
sylvania.
Part II explores the hybrid approach in greater detail, and
concludes that the approach is an impractical solution to the con-
Lehman Hutton, 596 A2d 860, 864 (Pa Super 1991) (noting that the contractual agreement
was silent with respect to class actions and holding that no Pennsylvania policy precludes
class-wide arbitration).
,5 See Keating, 645 P2d at 1209.
"6 Kay 0. Wilburn, A Clause You Don't Want to Overlook, Bus L Today 55, 57-58
(Nov-Dec 1996).
17 Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 Fran-
chise L J 141, 142 (1997).
S Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 Iowa L Rev 473, 524-29 (1987) (proposing modifications to judicial
practice, industry arbitration rules, and contract terms). Another extols the virtues of the
"hybrid" solution, in which a court retains supervisory authority over a consolidated class-
wide arbitration. Daniel R. Waltcher, Class-wide Arbitration and 10b-5 Claims in the
Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 74 Cornell L Rev 380 (1989).
" 9 USC §§ 1-16 (2000).
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flict between class actions and mandatory arbitration for three
reasons. First, the hybrid solution is practically unworkable. Sec-
ond, congressional history supports the exclusion of class proceed-
ings from arbitration. Third, the imposition of class-wide arbitra-
tion exceeds judicial authority. Finally, Part III argues that, al-
though case law evolves slowly, judicial modifications to the
treatment of arbitration fees provide the best way to address pub-
lic policy goals while encouraging judicial efficiency.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY
This section discusses the adoption and implementation of
the FAA. Part I A discusses congressional enactment of the FAA.
Part I B traces the subsequent explosion of Supreme Court deci-
sions under the FAA, through the adoption of the current liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration. Part I C explores the preva-
lent state court interpretation of case law-that absent explicit
statutory protection, a plaintiff who agrees to an arbitration pro-
vision waives his right to a class remedy. ° Part I D proceeds to
discuss some of the cases in which state courts have voided arbi-
tration provisions as an impermissible waiver of state statutory
remedies. Part I E explains the alternative interpretation of case
law-namely, the hybrid arbitration-litigation approach favored
by California and Pennsylvania.
A. Congressional Enactment of the FAA
Before congressional adoption of the FAA, contractual arbi-
tration clauses were revocable at will.2' A party who had previ-
ously agreed to arbitration of disputes could opt unilaterally for
litigation, severing the (now void) arbitration clause from the re-
mainder of the agreement.22 Congress changed this option in 1924
with the adoption of the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA made agree-
ments for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
" See, for example, Rains v Foundation Health Systems Life & Health, 23 P3d 1249,
1253 (Colo App 2001) ("[Alrbitration clauses are not unenforceable simply because they
might render a class action unavailable."); Sagal v First USA Bank, NA, 69 F Supp 2d
627, 632 (D Del 1999) (declining to carve out a class action exception to arbitration en-
forcement under the TILA).
23 See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U
Pa L Rev 132, 138-44 (1934).
22 See, for example, Hamilton v Home Insurance Co, 137 US 370, 385 (1890) (holding
arbitration provision to be distinct and collateral provision, unless made an express condi-
tion for the payment of money).
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upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."23 Representative Mills of New York, who intro-
duced the original bill in the House, explained that the FAA "pro-
vides that where there are commercial contracts and there is dis-
agreement under the contract, the court can enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement in the same way as other portions of the con-
tract."2 4 Similarly, the chairman of the New York Chamber of
Commerce testified before the Senate that the Act would "enable
business men to settle their disputes expeditiously and economi-
cally, and [would] reduce the congestion in the Federal and State
courts."25 A Senate Judiciary Committee Report supporting the
legislation explained that arbitration provides benefits to both
consumers and businesses through speedier resolution and lower
costs: "The desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation per-
sists. The desire grows with time and as delays and expense in-
crease. The settlement of disputes by arbitration appeals to big
business and little business alike, to corporate interests as well
as to individuals."26
B. Supreme Court Case Law since the Adoption of the FAA
The FAA may have marked the official adoption of a federal
policy favoring arbitration, but many years passed before courts
fully implemented this policy into case law. As late as 1953, in
Wilko v Swan,27 the Supreme Court voided an arbitration clause
in the securities broker-customer context as an impermissible
waiver of a plaintiff's right to select a judicial forum. 28 This judi-
cial hostility toward arbitration remained the prevailing view for
another thirty years.
The Supreme Court did not officially acknowledge the "lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" until 1983, in
the landmark case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mer-
cury Construction Corp.29 Moses H. Cone involved a contract dis-
pute between a hospital and a construction company.0 The con-
23 9 USC § 2 (2000).
24 65 Cong Rec H 11080 (June 6, 1924).
5' Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S 4213 and 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong, 4th Sess 2 (1923) ("Hearing on S 4213 and 4214").
20 68th Cong, 1st Sess, S Rep No 68-536, at 3 (1924).
27 346 US 427 (1953).
2 Id at 434-35.
29 460 US 1, 24 (1983).
31 Id at 4-5.
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tract provided that disputes submitted to, but not decided by, the
architect within a specified time could be submitted to binding
arbitration.31 After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dis-
pute,32 the hospital sought a judicial declaration that Mercury
was not entitled to arbitration.33 The Court ordered the dispute to
arbitration and stated that the hospital's second claim-against
the architect, who was not a party to the contract-must be re-
solved in state court because "the relevant federal law requires
piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitra-
tion agreement."34 More generally, the Court stated that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.""
In. 1985, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc,36 the Court reiterated its policy favoring arbitra-
tion when it reasoned that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum."37 On this logic, the Court expanded
the authority of the FAA to permit arbitrability of statutory anti-
trust claims, 8 and more generally, to issues raised in a counter-
claim.39 Since Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court has enforced man-
datory arbitration clauses in suits arising under a variety of sub-
stantive federal statutes, including the Sherman Act,4" the Secu-
rities Act of 1933,' the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,42 the civil
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO"),43 and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA").44
Id at 4.
32 Id at 6.
3 Moses H. Cone, 460 US at 7.
, Id at 20.
" Id at 24-25.
36 473 US 614 (1985).
" Id at 628.
38 Id.
" Id at 624-25.
'° 15 USC §§ 1-7 (2000). See Mitsubishi, 473 US at 636-37.
" 15 USC § 77a-bbbb (2000). See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express,
Inc, 490 US 477, 485-86 (1989).
" 15 USC § 78a-7811 (2000). Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 482 US
220, 222 (1987).
13 18 USC § 1962(c) (2000). See Shearson, 482 US at 242.
" 15 USC §§ 1601-66j (2000). See Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph,
531 US 79, 84 (2000).
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The Supreme Court officially overruled Wilko when it revis-
ited arbitration clauses in the securities setting in Shear-
son/American Express, Inc v McMahon.45 In McMahon, the Court
noted that because arbitration had become the functional equiva-
lent of adjudication, a plaintiff was no longer in danger of waiving
any substantive rights by arbitrating a claim.46 Under McMahon,
an arbitration clause is unenforceable only when clear congres-
sional intent indicates that a federal law was meant to override
the provisions of the FAA.47
In Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp," the Court clari-
fied its position by holding that a party opposing arbitration must
prove that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of the judicial
forum for the statutory claims at issue.49 Gilmer alleged that his
employer violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196750 ("ADEA") by discharging him at age sixty-two.51 At his em-
ployer's request, Gilmer had registered as a securities represen-
tative with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").52 Because
NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of "any controversy ...
arising out of the employment or termination of employment"5 3 of
a registered representative, Interstate/Johnson moved to compel
arbitration of Gilmer's claim.54 The Court affirmed the order to
arbitrate, finding that Gilmer did not prove that Congress in-
tended to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims.5
C. Judicial Interpretation of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Class Action Claims
Section 2 of the FAA, which compels judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements "in any.., contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce," contains no provisions specific to class
482 US 220 (1987).
,' See id at 229 ("[Where arbitration does provide an adequate means of enforcing the
provisions of the Exchange Act, § 29(a) [prohibiting waiver of substantive obligations
imposed by Exchange Act] does not void a predispute waiver of § 27 [granting exclusive
jurisdiction of Exchange Act violations to the district courts].").
17 Id at 226-27.
4' 500 US 20 (1991).
Id at 26.
29 USC §§ 621-34 (2000).
Gilmer, 500 US at 23-24.
1 Id at 23.
5 NYSE Rule 347.
Gilmer, 500 US at 23-24.
Id at 35.
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action claims.56 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, Inc v Dobson,57 the
Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 to implement Congress's
intent "to exercise [its] commerce power to the full."58 As the
Court explained in Mitsubishi, arbitration is mandated in all
situations where the arbitral forum offers protection of the sub-
stantive rights created by a particular statute. 9 Thus, courts rul-
ing on motions to compel arbitration in class action proceedings
must determine whether the inability to proceed as a class would
constitute an impermissible waiver of a substantive statutory
right.w
In some cases, interpreting the effect of arbitration clauses
on class actions is simple because the contracting parties have
included a clause explicitly barring class-wide arbitration. For
example, the arbitration clause at issue in Lozada v Dale Baker
Oldsmobile, Inc61 contained the following language: "The arbitra-
tion shall not be consolidated with any other arbitration."62 Or-
ganizations such as the SEC,' Nasdaq,' and the NYSE have
adopted blanket rules excluding class actions from arbitration.r
A plaintiff's right to litigate class action claims is waivable, 67
even when that procedural right is expressly provided by statute,
as it is in the TILA.6 A Delaware Superior Court found that, un-
der Delaware law, an arbitration clause that precluded class-wide
arbitration of disputes was not unconscionable because "[t]he sur-
render of that class action right was clearly articulated in the
56 19USC§2.
5 513 US 265 (1995).
Id at 277.
' Mitsubishi, 473 US at 628.
FRCP 23, by contrast, is a procedural right. See Part II C.
" 91 F Supp 2d 1087 (W D Mich 2000).
6' Id at 1099.
' See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class
Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed Reg 52659, 52660 (Nov 4, 1992).
See NASD Rule 10301.
NYSE Rule 600(d), available online at <http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Rules.pdf> (vis-
ited Sept 27, 2003) ("A claim submitted as a class action shall not be eligible for arbitra-
tion.").
See, for example, Nielsen v Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc, 66 F3d 145, 148-49 (7th
Cir 1995) (finding arbitration of class action prohibited by NASD Rules); Olde Discount
Corp v Hubbard, 4 F Supp 2d 1268, 1271 (D Kan 1998) (same).
7 See Rains, 23 P3d at 1253 ("[Alrbitration clauses are not unenforceable simply
because they might render a class action unavailable."). See also Pyburn v Bill Heard
Chevrolet, 63 SW3d 351, 364 (Tenn App 2001).
See, for example, Sagal v First USA Bank, NA, 69 F Supp 2d 627, 632 (D Del 1999)
(declining to carve out an exception to arbitration enforcement under the TILA).
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arbitration amendment."6 Similarly, a Florida court upheld a
forum selection clause when the effect of enforcement was to pre-
clude class relief.70
However, the vast majority of contracts merely incorporate
boilerplate arbitration clauses patterned after* the American Ar-
bitration Association ("AAA") prototype. The arbitration clause at
issue in Powertel, Inc v Bexley 1 serves as a standard example.
The clause read:
Any unresolved dispute, controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to [Powertel's] service, including but not lim-
ited to a claim based on or arising from an alleged tort,
shall be settled by arbitration administered by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association under its [industry-specific
rules], and judgment on the award rendered by the arbi-
trator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.'
When faced with a contract which-like the Powertel example-is
silent with respect to class proceedings, courts will generally as-
sume that assent to arbitration indicates waiver of the right to
bring a class action.73 For example, in Johnson v West Suburban
Bank,74 the Third Circuit ordered plaintiff's TILA75 and Electronic
Fund Transfer Act76 ("EFTA") class action claims to proceed indi-
vidually in arbitration.77 The court noted that neither the TILA
nor the EFTA explicitly precludes the selection of arbitration in-
stead of litigation, and that neither statute specifically confers
the rights to proceed as a class. 78 As such, the court noted that "it
Edelist v MBNA America Bank, 790 A2d 1249, 1261 (Del Super 2001).
o America Online, Inc v Booker, 781 So2d 423, 425 (Fla App 2001).
71 743 So2d 570 (Fla App 1999).
72 Id at 572. The parties agreed that the use of consumer services constituted a trans-
action in interstate commerce, and was thus subject to the FAA. Id.
71 See, for example, Dominum Austin Partners, LLC v Emerson, 248 F3d 720, 728-29
(8th Cir 2001) (finding that where arbitration clause made "no provision for arbitration as
a class," the district court properly compelled named plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims as
individuals); Champ v Siegel Trading Co, Inc, 55 F3d 269, 275-77 (7th Cir 1995) (finding
class-wide arbitration prohibited where the "arbitration agreement [made] no mention of
class arbitration" and "[did] not expressly provide for class arbitration"); Gammaro v
Thorp Consumer Discount Co, 15 F3d 93, 96 (8th Cir 1994) (requiring plaintiff to arbitrate
own claims before court would entertain class allegations).
74 225 F3d 366 (3d Cir 2000).
" 15 USC § 1601-66j.
76 15 USC § 1693 (2000).
7 Johnson, 225 F3d at 377 n 4.
78 Id at 369.
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appears impossible" for parties to pursue a class action in arbi-
tration "unless the arbitration agreement contemplates such a
procedure."79 The court dismissed allegations that arbitration
would discourage a plaintiff from asserting his rights under the
TILA, positing instead that the TILA's statutory cap on litigious
class recoveries may make arbitration a more financially attrac-
tive option.80 Moreover, the court pointed to the provision provid-
ing for recovery of attorneys' fees to support its contention that a
steady supply of lawyers would remain willing to pursue TILA
claims. 8
D. Voiding Arbitration Clauses
Section 2 of the FAA guides judicial inquiry into the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements by providing that such agree-
ments are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 2 Courts apply state
law to determine whether generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements.' Accordingly, some courts
have relied upon state contract law principles to void an arbitra-
tion clause that would preclude a class remedy when such remedy
is expressly authorized by state statute.84
1. Federal law preemption of state contract law.
Southland Corp v Keating"' involved multiple suits filed by
franchisees against their franchisor, alleging violations of Cali-
fornia law.8 The California Supreme Court voided the arbitration
provision in the franchise agreements, concluding that the Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law87 mandated judicial considera-
'9 Id at 377 n 4.
Id at 374-75.
Johnson, 225 F3d at 374-75.
9 USC § 2.
Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996).
See, for example, Powertel, 743 So2d 570, 577 (Fla App 1999) (voiding arbitration
clause for procedural and substantive unconscionability under Florida law); Lozada v Dale
Baker Oldsmobile, Inc, 91 F Supp 2d 1087, 1102-05 (W D Mich 2000) (reaching similar
conclusion under Michigan law); Ramirez v Circuit City Stores Inc, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 916,
920-21 (Cal App 1999) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable under California law
because it is unilateral and bars punitive damages).
' 465 US 1 (1984).
Id at 4.
Cal Corp Code Ann § 31000 et seq (West 1977). The law invalidated certain arbitra-
tion agreements that were permissible under the FAA.
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tion of claims brought pursuant to it and "did not contravene" the
FAA.88 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA is
binding upon the states and preempts any state laws invalidating
FAA provisions.8 Because the FAA mandated enforcement of con-
tractual arbitration provisions, a blanket provision like Califor-
nia's, requiring judicial involvement, would affect only those con-
tracts that normally would be subject to arbitration; as such, the
provision directly contradicted the goals of the FAA and was
void.9 Likewise, in Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto,91 the Su-
preme Court voided a state statute requiring contracts with arbi-
tration clauses to contain a notice typed on the first page in capi-
tal letters and underlined.! The Court held that Section 2 of the
FAA preempts state law provisions that apply only to contracts
that are subject to arbitration, and permits only provisions that
apply equally to "any contract."93
2. Unconscionability and the availability of equivalent relief
The Supreme Court has held that "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate [his] statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its re-
medial and deterrent function."' Thus, the federal policy favoring
arbitration rests on the assumption that the arbitral and judicial
forums provide equivalent relief. On this basis, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has held that an arbitration clause is not enforceable if it
would defeat the remedial purpose of the statute upon which an
action is based.9
Both federal and state courts have used this reasoning to
void contractual arbitration provisions for unconscionability un-
der state law.' Powertel involved a 23(b)(3) consumer class action
Keating, 465 US at 5.
Id at 16-17.
Id at 16.
9' 517 US 681 (1996).
" Id at 683.
Id at 686.
Mitsubishi, 473 US at 637.
Randolph v Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama, 178 F3d 1149, 1157-58 (1lth Cir
1999); Paladino v Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc, 134 F3d 1054, 1059 (11th Cir 1998).
" See, for example, Steven J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's
Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 31 Wake Forest L Rev 1001 (1996) (reviewing federal court
holdings regarding unconscionability); Szetela v Discover Bank, 118 Cal Rptr 2d 862, 864
(Cal App 2002) (striking portion of arbitration clause barring class or representative ac-
tions as unconscionable).
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alleging wrongful long distance charges.' The Florida Court of
Appeals denied Powertel's motion to compel arbitration and
voided the arbitration provision as both procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable under Florida law.9' The court found
procedural unconscionability because the arbitration clause was
adopted in an adhesion contract9 and because the consumers had
no choice but to agree to the new arbitration clause if they wished
to continue service." The court based its finding of substantive
unconscionability on the fact that the waiver limited Powertel's
liability to actual damages by precluding the possibility that it
would ever be exposed to a class remedy, which was expressly
provided for by a state consumer protection statute. '01 Hypotheti-
cally, the Powertel court could have satisfied the literal statutory
requirements by ordering the class action to proceed in arbitra-
tion. By declining to do so, the court concluded that an arbitration
clause and class action claim are incompatible.
The Western District of Michigan issued a similar holding in
Lozada, a suit brought by class member automobile purchasers
against an automobile dealership. The Lozada court based its
analysis on the test for validity of an arbitration agreement laid
out in an earlier Michigan state case:
[T]o be enforceable and reasonable, an arbitration agree-
ment must meet three elements: (1) the parties must have
agreed to arbitrate the claims (there must be a valid, bind-
ing contract governing the statutory claims in issue); (2)
the statute involved must not prohibit such agreements;
and (3) the arbitration agreement must not waive the sub-
stantive rights and remedies of the statute and the arbi-
tration procedures must be fair so that the [plaintiffl may
effectively vindicate his statutory rights.102
743 So2d at 572.
'8 Id at 574. Alternatively, the request was denied because Powertel attempted to add
the arbitration requirement after the lawsuit had been filed. Id at 577.
" An adhesion contract is a "standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be
signed by the party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who has little choice about the
terms." Black's Law Dictionary 318-19 (West 7th ed 1999).
'® Powertel, 743 So2d at 575. The court rejected Powertel's argument that the con-
sumers could cancel their phone service and sign agreements with new providers, because
the consumers' equipment could only be used with the Powertel service and because their
telephone numbers could not be transferred to a new provider. Id.
Id at 576.
'02 Lozada, 91 F Supp 2d at 1102-03, citing Rembert v Ryan's Family Steak Houses,
Inc, 596 NW2d 208, 226 (Mich App 1999).
[2003:
6311 CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
The court held that to be "fair" under this definition, the agree-
ment must contain the following minimal procedural protections:
(1) clear notice, (2) right to counsel, (3) reasonable discovery, (4) a
fair hearing, and (5) a neutral arbitrator."
The Lozada court held that, because the TILA and the corre-
sponding Michigan statute both expressly provide for the avail-
ability of injunctive and declaratory relief, °M an arbitration clause
that did not specifically permit such relief was unreasonable."
Consequently, the court voided the arbitration clauses in the
plaintiffs' contracts and allowed the class action to proceed. 1°6
The Florida and Michigan decisions follow naturally from
Supreme Court precedent. A court compelling arbitration under a
state statute that provides for a particular type of relief-and
which applies to all contracts-may only compel arbitration if
that relief is available in the arbitral setting. Because class suits
cannot practically or legally proceed in arbitration, the Florida
and Michigan courts properly refused to compel arbitration of the
class claims. State legislatures concerned with protecting con-
sumers may thus avoid the default rule of class action waiver and
individual arbitration by expressly incorporating class remedies
into statutes.
3. Arbitration costs.
Does the absence of a provision limiting arbitration costs ef-
fectively prevent the use of the arbitral forum to vindicate rights?
Cost has become especially relevant in light of Green Tree Finan-
cial Corp-Alabama v Randolph,'°7 in which the Supreme Court
held that, while it is possible for arbitration fees to be so burden-
some as to prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that arbitration is "prohibi-
tively expensive.' °8 Lower court interpretation of the Green Tree
ruling varies widely.
The District of Columbia Circuit ruled in the context of fed-
eral employment claims that, to be enforceable, an arbitration
agreement may not require employees either to pay unreasonable
.. Id at 1103.
" Mich Comp Laws § 445.911(3).
Lozada, 91 F Supp 2d at 1105.
Id at 1105 (finding arbitration clause to be procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable).
107 531 US 79 (2000).
108 Id at 92.
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costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access
to the arbitration forum." The Southern District of Florida ruled
similarly when it held that a contractual provision splitting at-
torneys' fees, coupled with a failure to limit the arbitration ex-
pense allotted to the consumer, made an arbitration clause unen-
forceable under the TILA." °
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by the Southern
District of Florida, presumably rejecting plaintiffs' argument that
the prohibitive cost of arbitration was itself a sufficient reason to
void the arbitration clause."' This ruling echoed the sentiment of
many other courts. The Northern District of Illinois held that a
consumer may not avoid an arbitration agreement by complain-
ing of costs,"1 2 and the Middle District of Alabama declined to
deem an arbitration provision that failed to limit arbitration costs
unconscionable under Alabama law."' Likewise, a Colorado Court
of Appeals rejected a plaintiff's contention that arbitration should
not be ordered because it was too expensive.'
E. Court-Ordered Class-wide Arbitration
Two state courts have ordered class action claims to proceed
in arbitration. In Keating v Superior Court,"5 the California Su-
preme Court concluded that forcing independent arbitration of
claims would seriously prejudice the interests of numerous fran-
chisees seeking relief against their franchisor.' 6 The court argued
that public policy favored class-wide arbitration, stating that the
interest of justice required the court to "give expression to the
basic arbitration commitment of the parties.""' 7 In justifying its
decision, the court relied on state law that expressly permitted
courts to consolidate arbitrations.1 8
" Cole v Burns International Security Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1482 (DC Cir 1997).
... Baron v Best Buy Co, Inc, 75 F Supp 2d 1368, 1370-71 (S D Fla 1999).
.. See Baron v Best Buy Co, Inc, 260 F3d 625 (11th Cir 2001) (unpublished opinion).
.. Dorsey v HCP Sales, Inc, 46 F Supp 2d 804, 808 (N D Ill 1999).
,, Rhode v E & TInvestments, Inc, 6 F Supp 2d 1322, 1328 (M D Ala 1998).
Rains, 23 P3d at 1253.
1,5 645 P2d 1192 (Cal 1982). For a more thorough overview of Keating, see Elizabeth P.
Allor, Note, Keating v Superior Court. Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Con-
tracts, 71 Cal L Rev 1239 (1983).
"' Keating, 645 P2d at 1207.
" Id.
". Id at 1208 & n 19. Cal Civ Proc Code § 1281.3 permits consolidation of separate
arbitration proceedings when:
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In Dickler v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc,119 a Pennsylvania
Superior Court explained that the strong federal and state poli-
cies favoring arbitration required it to interpret the words "any
controversy" in the parties' arbitration agreement to include class
actions."2° This freedom of contract argument-perhaps the
strongest argument in favor of class-wide arbitration-is dis-
cussed in more detail in Part II B.
Unlike consolidations, where all parties are present to repre-
sent their own interests, class actions involve a representative
party acting on behalf of absent class members.' The courts in-
voking class-wide arbitration have recognized that class-wide ar-
bitration is "a different animal" than individual arbitration, and
have acknowledged the need for substantial trial court involve-
ment. 12 2 Scholars have echoed these concerns, and offer several
justifications for judicial intervention. First, class certification, '23
notice requirements, 24 and designation of an appropriate class
representative 125 involve complicated legal questions on which
arbitrators may be more likely than judges to commit error.126
(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties;
or one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third
party; and (2) The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related
transactions; and (3) There is common issue or issues of law or fact creating the pos-
sibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
Although the FAA does not specifically mention consolidation of arbitrations, some federal
courts of appeals, at the time of the Keating decision, permitted consolidation where cases
involved a common nucleus of law and fact. The Third Circuit, for example, reasoned that
because a contract required arbitration of "all claims, disputes, and other matters," the
parties had implicitly agreed to consolidation of claims in arbitration. Gavlik Construction
Co v HF Campbell Co, 526 F2d 777, 788 (3d Cir 1975). See Compania Espanola de
Petroleos, SA v Nereus Shipping, SA, 527 F2d 966, 975 (2d Cir 1975) (holding that the
liberal interpretation of the FAA encourages consolidation of arbitration proceedings).
However, not all circuits followed this lead. The Ninth Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser Co v West-
ern Seas Shipping Co, declined to consolidate arbitration claims where the parties did not
explicitly contemplate such a situation. 743 F2d 635, 637 (9th Cir 1984).
.. 596 A2d 860 (Pa Super 1991).
... Id at 867.
12' Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 399 & n 120 (cited in note 18).
122 Dickler, 596 A2d at 866. See also Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 404-05 (cited in
note 18).
FRCP 23(c)(1).
FRCP 23(c)(2).
12' FRCP 23(a).
, ' See Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 405 n 156 (cited in note 18), citing T. Oehmke,
Commercial Arbitration § 9:4, 162-63 (Lawyers Co-op 1987) ("There are no strict qualifi-
cations to serve as an arbitrator-it is not necessary to be an attorney, although legal
training is evidently helpful. The most important quality is expertise in the subject of the
dispute.").
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Second, even the Supreme Court has expressed concern over the
fact that arbitrators may decide cases without providing thorough
legal explanations or complete records of the proceedings.
27
Third, Section 10 of the FAA,12 8 which provides an extremely high
hurdle for vacating an arbitrator's decision,1 29 effectively elimi-
nates from arbitration the appeals process enjoyed in the court
system. 3° This greatly reduces the likelihood that an erroneous
arbitration decision will be corrected, and thus amplifies the po-
tential for societal harm.
An advocate of class-wide arbitration might dismiss these
concerns by pointing out that class settlements (which account for
the vast majority of class action certifications)' also conclude
without complete records or thorough legal explanations. At first
glance, this would seem to imply that courts are willing to forgo
the benefits of clear records or explanations when parties have
arrived at a mutually agreeable solution. However, such an as-
sertion ignores the fact that Rule 23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires court approval for class settlements. 3 '
Congress has deemed it necessary for a court to ensure that the
parties' interests are served in a fair and proper manner, even in
the absence of litigation. Moreover, when a proceeding is truly
adversarial (as it is during the class certification period), proce-
dural safeguards specific to class actions are of the utmost impor-
tance.
Owing to the distinct attributes of class litigation, both the
Keating and Dickler courts recognized that class-wide arbitration
would necessarily entail a greater degree of judicial involvement
than is normally associated with individual arbitration.1 3  The
Keating court would need to guide certification and notice proce-
dures "to safeguard the rights of absent class members to ade-
'27 See Gilmer, 500 US at 31 (recognizing that arbitrators often will not issue written
opinions, thus reducing effectiveness of appellate review, but stating that the NYSE rules
avoid this problem by requiring arbitration awards to be detailed in writing); McMahon,
482 US at 257 (Blackmun dissenting) (citing the lack of judicial review and difficulty in
vacating an award as concerns).
" 9 USC § 10 (2000).
29 An arbitration award may be vacated only for (1) fraud or corruption in procuring
the award; (2) arbitrator partiality; (3) arbitrator misconduct resulting in prejudice to a
party; or (4) failure of the arbitrators to reach a "mutual, final, and definite award." Id.
Note that errors of law-even constitutional violations-are not subject to correction.
20 See, for example, FRAP 3(a) (providing rule for filing a notice of appeal).
... Robert H. Klonoff and Edward H.K. Bilich, Class Actions and Other Multi-Party
Litigation 362 (West 2000).
..2 FRCP 23(c)(1).
,33 Keating, 645 P2d at 1209; Dickler, 596 A2d at 866.
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quate representation."1 34 California has ordered this type of "hy-
brid" arbitration-litigation many times since Keating.131
II. THE HYBRID SOLUTION IS IMPRACTICAL AND IMPROPER
One commentator has echoed the California and Pennsyl-
vania courts in suggesting that, because there are strong federal
policies favoring both class actions and arbitration, the judiciary
should "permit the combination of the two devices" rather than
choose between them.36 The suggestion may be appealing ini-
tially, if for no reason but its appearance of compromise. Part II
of this Comment reviews the purposes behind class actions and
arbitration in an effort to highlight the inherent incompatibility
of the two devices. Because arbitrators are ill-equipped to conduct
class action arbitrations, class-wide arbitration is untenable in
practice. Congressional history supports the exclusion of class
proceedings from arbitration. Moreover, because judicial over-
sight of class-wide arbitration exceeds the limits of congressional
judicial authority, the only statutorily permissible solution is to
interpret arbitration clauses to waive class actions.
A. Incompatibilities Between the Policies Favoring Class Actions
and Those Favoring Arbitration
In analyzing the purported benefit of a judicially monitored
class-wide arbitration, it is useful to revisit the independent
benefits of an arbitration system and class remedies. Class action
suits serve mainly as efficiency-promoting devices, both reducing
the judicial caseload and providing societal benefit by simultane-
ously resolving multiple individual claims. 3 7 The assurance of
... 645 P2d at 1209. The Dickler court was less concerned with due process issues,
relying in part on Stevenson v Commonwealth Department of Revenue, 413 A2d 667 (Pa
1980), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a class action claim before the state
Board of Arbitration of Claims to be proper. Id at 668. The Stevenson court concluded that
the risk of procedural error in class-wide arbitration was minimized because the Board
had adopted the entire Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, including class action rules,
to govern its proceedings. Id.
... See, for example, Blue Cross of California v Superior Court, 78 Cal Rptr 2d 779, 790
(Cal App 1998) (holding that class-wide arbitrations were not preempted by FAA); Izzi v
Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal Rptr 315, 321 (Cal App 1986) (holding that the court was
bound by Keating precedent); Lewis v Prudential Bache Securities Inc, 225 Cal Rptr 69, 75
(Cal App 1986) ("This case appears to offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit
the class action mold, with adequate judicial supervision over the class aspects.").
131 Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 395-98 (cited in note 18).
,' See Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F2d 555, 560 (2d Cir 1968), vacd 417 US 156
(1974) ("By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be re-
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consistent outcomes ensures fairness and certainty. 38 Perhaps
most importantly, class actions permit plaintiffs to pursue claims
that, individually, may not warrant the outlay of litigation
costs. 139
Arbitration, too, provides efficiency gains. Then-Chief Justice
Warren Burger, in a 1982 article, listed some of the important
advantages of private arbitration in large, commercial disputes:
* Parties can select the arbitrator, taking into account
the special experience and knowledge of the arbitrator.
* A privately selected arbitrator can conduct all proceed-
ings in a setting with less stress on the parties; confi-
dentiality can be preserved where there is a valid need
to protect trade secrets, for example.
* Arbitration can cope with complex business contracts,
economic and accounting evidence, and financial
statements. A skilled arbitrator, acting as the trier,
can digest evidence at his own time and pace without
the expensive panoply of the judicial process....
" Parties to arbitration can readily stipulate to discovery
processes in a way that can control, if not eliminate,
abuses of those processes.1 4 0
Congressional debate surrounding passage of the FAA indicates
that its adoption was meant to address "agitation against the
costliness and delays of litigation." 4 ' Arbitrators avoid delays in
the traditional process through informal rules of evidence,'
solved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litiga-
tion and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which
would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation."); Esplin v Hirschi, 402 F2d
94, 101 (10th Cir 1968), quoting Dolgow v Anderson, 43 FRD 472, 488 (E D NY 1968) ("lIlt
is virtually certain that a class action will 'achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated.').
See Eisen, 391 F2d at 560.
Id at 560, 566 n 16.
Burger, 68 ABA J 274 (cited in note 6). See also William Rehnquist, A Jurist's View
of Arbitration, 32 Arb J 1, 7 (1977).
HR Rep No 68-96, at 2 (1924).
" American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, R-
31(a) (2003), available online at <http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSP
src=upload \ LIVESITE \ RulesProcedures \ NationalInternational \.. \.. \ focusArea \ comm
ercial\AAA235current.htm#R31> (visited Sept 27, 2003) ("Conformity to legal rules of
evidence shall not be necessary.").
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flexibility in scheduling13 and conducting proceedings,'" and lim-
ited review of awards.
14 5
The FAA contains an "unmistakably clear" statement of con-
gressional purpose that "the arbitration procedure, when selected
by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay
and obstruction in the courts."46 A hybrid solution is thus im-
proper because it subjects arbitration to the very judicial burden
that the contracting parties sought to avoid through arbitra-
tion.
147
FAA provisions clearly outline the extent to which the judici-
ary may be involved in arbitration proceedings. Congress has
granted courts the power to enforce arbitration clauses,'" appoint
arbitrators where necessary, 149 and perform limited review of
awards. "" Congress has not, however, granted explicit judicial
authority to oversee class action arbitration. A defendant of the
hybrid system dismisses this by explaining that "the legislators
who enacted the FAA apparently did not foresee the litigation
burdens confronting today's judiciary [or] the complexity with
which litigation has developed." 5' The commentator then asserts
that Congress's failure to authorize judicial supervision of arbi-
tration proceedings "may not necessarily indicate an implied pro-
hibition against class-wide arbitration."'52
While the commentator's observation regarding Congress's
lack of foresight is likely true, courts should not interpret con-
gressional inaction at the time of adoption to implicitly authorize
class-wide arbitration. The Supreme Court has held that courts
should not consider Congress's understanding of its own power at
... Id at R-28 ("The arbitrator may postpone any hearing upon agreement of the par-
ties, upon request of a party for good cause shown, or upon the arbitrator's own initia-
tive.").
"' Id at R-30(a) ("The arbitrator has the discretion to vary this procedure, provided
that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard
and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.").
,' See 9 USC § 10 (allowing an arbitration award to be vacated only for fraud, corrup-
tion, or if the arbitrator is guilty of partiality, misconduct, or exceeding his powers).
,' Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co, 388 US 395, 404 (1967).
,47 Even WaItcher's least intrusive option for hybrid proceedings suffers from this flaw.
Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 405 (cited in note 18) ("[Alrbitration without court involve-
ment during the actual proceedings, but with class certification hearings at the filing of
the action and a freer appeals process at the close of the arbitration [I presents the most
effective means of protecting all interests involved.").
9 USC §§ 2-4.
9 USC § 5.
9 USC §§ 9-12.
... Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 402 (cited in note 18).
162 Id.
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the time of adoption in interpreting the FAA.'5 3 Thus, courts in-
terpreting the FAA must rely only on the statutory language and
underlying purpose of the legislation in reaching their decisions.
Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams.. involved a state law em-
ployment discrimination claim.'55 Because the plaintiff employee
had signed an employment contract requiring all employment
disputes to be settled by arbitration, the employer asked the
court to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA."16 The employee
argued that Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes from its cover-
age "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce"1 57 voided the arbitration provision. 58 The Supreme Court
disagreed. 5 9 While the Court acknowledged that Congress might
have chosen a different jurisdictional formulation had it known
that the Court would later embrace a less restrictive reading of
the Commerce Clause, ' 6° it held that a rule requiring deconstruc-
tion of statutory phrases depending on the year of enactment
would be unwieldy.' 6' The Court explained that although "the his-
torical arguments respecting Congress' understanding of its
power in 1925 are not insubstantial, this fact alone does not give
us basis to adopt, 'by judicial decision rather than amendatory
legislation,' an expansive construction of the FAA's exclusion pro-
vision that goes beyond the meaning of the words Congress
used."
M
Yet even if one acknowledges that the Court may interpret a
"4controversy" " to include class actions, a solution which views
the arbitration clause and class proceeding as equally meritori-
ous-such as class-wide arbitration-does not follow logically.
The Supreme Court has long prioritized certain aspects of class
action suits over others. In Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin,'64 the
Court held that a plaintiff who was unable to bear the cost of no-
... Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams, 532 US 105,118 (2001).
,5' 532 US 105 (2001).
'5 Id at 110.
156 Id at 109-10.
"1 9 USC § 1.
"8 Circuit City, 532 US at 114.
159 Id.
' Id at 119.
' ' Id at 118.
62 Circuit City, 532 US at 119, quoting Gulf Oil Corp v Copp Paving Co, 419 US 186,
202 (1974).
,3 9 USC § 2.
' 417 US 156 (1974).
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tice to potential class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action was
barred from bringing his claim.'6' By upholding even prohibitively
expensive procedural requirements, the Court recognized that a
plaintiff does not enjoy an absolute right to bring a class action
suit.
When a case is particularly large or complex, the cost of arbi-
tration proceedings often exceeds that of traditional litigation.'6
Because Congress stated that the intent of the FAA was to allow
parties to minimize the costs of litigation and expedite dispute
resolution, 67 the FAA is most compatible with a model that re-
quires claims to be arbitrated on an individual basis.
B. The Role of Congressional History in Interpreting the FAA
The Supreme Court has held that legislative history should
only be consulted when statutory ambiguity exists.1 6 An advocate
of class-wide arbitration could argue that as a strict textual mat-
ter, the phrase "a controversy" in the FAA means any controversy.
After all, businesses had the option of inserting language to ex-
clude class proceedings from arbitration and did not choose to do
so. The language is clear, and a court should honor the parties'
intent by ordering class-wide arbitration; congressional intent in
this case is irrelevant. Supreme Court precedent, however, con-
tradicts the argument that the FAA is unambiguous. In Circuit
City, the Court faced the question of whether the term "any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" 169 re-
ferred to workers generally. 70 The Court chose to read the phrase
narrowly, determining that it was meant merely to modify "sea-
man" and "railroad employees," and limited its application to
workers engaged in the transportation industry.17 In interpreting
the meaning of this seemingly unambiguous clause, the Court
relied upon pre-FAA congressional action regarding disputes be-
tween seamen and their employers to determine that Congress
had enacted separate legislation specifically to deal with this
Id at 176.
" Herbert M. Kritzer and Jill Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative
Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration
Association and the Courts, 8 Just Sys J 6, 14-17 (1983).
67 Hearing on S 4213 and 4214 (cited in note 26).
1'6 Ratzlafv United States, 510 US 135, 147-48 (1994) ("[Wle do not resort to legisla-
tive history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.").
16 9 USC § 1.
.70 Circuit City, 532 US at 114.
,' Id at 119.
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class of workers.172 Similarly, a court determining whether the
phrase "a controversy"73 includes class actions should consider
congressional purpose surrounding adoption of the Act.
A court looking at congressional purpose should focus on the
statement that the goal of the FAA was to "settle [ ] disputes ex-
peditiously and economically" and "reduce the congestion in the
Federal and State courts."'74 At first glance, it would appear that
a court could achieve these goals by either ordering individual
claims to arbitration or by consolidating arbitration into a class
proceeding. Class proceedings, however, are invariably large and
complex. As it is often more expensive to arbitrate large and
complex cases than it is to litigate them, 75 class arbitration would
be anything but expeditious and economical. Thus, courts can
achieve the stated congressional goals only by ordering individual
arbitration.
C. The Limits of Arbitral Judicial Authority
One commentator has asserted that statutory authority to
enforce arbitration implies judicial power to make arbitration
effective.'76 Likewise, some plaintiffs have cited the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as a statutory basis for judicial authority.'77 For
example, Rule 81(a)(3) provides that in "proceedings under Title
9, U.S.C., relating to arbitration .. . [the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are
not provided for in those statutes."'78 Rule 42(a) authorizes con-
solidation "[wihen actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court."179 Although their language
suggests that because the FAA is silent with respect to consolida-
tion of proceedings, Rule 81(a)(3) provides a basis through which
' Id at 121, citing Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, 17 Stat 262, and Transporta-
tion Act of 1920, 41 Stat 456.
71 9 USC § 2.
,' Hearing on S 4213 and 4214 (cited in note 25).
17' Kritzer and Anderson, 8 Just Sys J at 14-17 (cited in note 166).
176 See Stipanowich, 72 Iowa L Rev at 526 (cited in note 18) ("In the absence of an
express statutory provision, courts should be permitted to order consolidation as a corol-
lary of the power to compel arbitration in accordance with the purposes and policies of
modem statutes ... if this end can be accomplished without undue prejudice to any
party.").
,17 See, for example, Champ v Siegel Trading Co, 55 F3d 269 (7th Cir 1995); Ore &
Chemical Corp v Stinnes Interoil, Inc, 606 F Supp 1510 (S D NY 1985).
78 FRCP 81(a)(3).
FRCP 42(a). As is plain from the text, the rule does not specifically grant authority
to consolidate arbitration claims.
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courts may consolidate arbitrations pursuant to Rule 42(a), such
an inference cannot be made in the contractual setting. The rules
of procedure "do not provide sufficient basis for a court, in effect,
to reform the parties' contracts and force them to arbitrate their
disputes in a manner not provided for in the arbitration agree-
ments." s° As the Seventh Circuit held in Champ v Siegel Trading
Co,' s' "absent an express provision in the parties' arbitration
agreement providing for class arbitration, Rule 81(a)(3) does not
provide a district court with the authority to reform the parties'
agreement and order the arbitration panel to hear these claims
on a class basis pursuant to Rule 23."'82
By citing procedural authority to oversee class actions, courts
mandating class-wide arbitration overstep the explicit power
granted to them under federal law. Federal law permits judicial
enforcement of arbitration clauses and, when necessary, ap-
pointment of arbitrators."" Section 4 of the FAA grants courts
authority to "direct[ I the parties to proceed to arbitration in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement."8 Thus, parties can
only be forced to consolidate arbitration if they have specifically
incorporated such a provision into the contract."' The Supreme
Court has emphasized that courts must rigorously enforce the
parties' agreement as they wrote it, "even if the result is 'piece-
meal' litigation."" Courts undertaking a contractual analysis of
an arbitration clause have determined that the rules of privity
demand that arbitration be limited to disputes between the con-
tract signatories.18 7 By ordering class-wide arbitration, a court
impermissibly rewrites the parties' contract, regardless of
Ore & Chemical Corp, 606 F Supp at 1513.
181 55 F3d 269 (7th Cir 1995).
'8' Id at 276-77.
9 USC §§ 2-5.
9 USC § 4 (emphasis added).
" See Weyerhaueser Co v Western Seas Shipping Co, 743 F2d 635, 637 (9th Cir 1984)
(declining to order consolidated arbitration because parties contracted for arbitration
generally, and not for consolidated arbitration specifically); WJ Megin, Inc v State, 434
A2d 306, 308 (Conn 1980) ("[1In light of our repeated emphasis on the central role played
by the terms of a contract in determining the scope of arbitration .... there is no judicial
authority to [order consolidation].").
18 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213, 221 (1985).
18, See, for example, Bay County Building Authority v Spence Brothers, 362 NW2d 739,
741 (Mich App 1984) (declining to order consolidated arbitration because additional plain-
tiffs lacked privity with the contract between the named plaintiff and defendant); Pueblo
of Laguna v Cillessen & Son, Inc, 682 P2d 197, 199 (NM 1984) ("[iNleither the provisions
quoted, nor any other clauses in either contract provide for the arbitration of disputes
other than those arising between the parties to each contract.").
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whether the result is economically or procedurally more effi-
cient. ' 8
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS ARE BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH
WAIVER OF CLASS ACTIONS
At its root, a mandatory arbitration clause is a contractual
matter. '89 Principles of contract law dictate that courts may not
void a contract for mere unfairness; a party is free to bargain
himself into an unfavorable position.' 9° This section argues that
current modifications in judicial allocation of arbitration fees pro-
vide a better way to simultaneously honor contractual intent and
protect a plaintiff's ability to seek remedy than does class-wide
arbitration. A judicial solution-despite developing slowly-is the
best way to address public policy goals while encouraging judicial
efficiency.
A. Freedom of Contract
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to void contractual
arbitration agreements, even where one party to a bargain exer-
cises uneven control. In Gilmer, the Court expressed this rule
quite clearly, stating that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power
... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable." '' Even adhesion contracts, through which
most mandatory arbitration clauses are adopted, may not be
voided easily.'9 May a court review the pricing terms of each con-
tract for sale, either giving its blessing or forcing a discount? The
answer, of course, is no, as this would be a drain on judicial re-
sources and an impermissible foray into the parties' freedom of
contract. Instead, bargaining permits the parties to negotiate to-
'" See Balfour, Guthrie & Co, Ltd v Commercial Metals Co, 607 P2d 856, 857 (Wash
1980) ("The court should not meddle with [the parties'] contractual provisions even though
we might fashion a more expedient, efficient and economical remedy.").
... See 9 USC § 2 ('[An arbitration agreement] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.").
Gilmer, 500 US at 33.
"' Id. The Court went on to say that "[rielationships between securities dealers and
investors, for example, may involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held
in Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are
enforceable." Id.
... See Keating v Superior Court, 645 P2d 1192, 1197 (Cal 1982), quoting Graham v
Scissor-Tail, Inc, 623 P2d 165, 172 (Cal 1981) ("To describe a contract as adhesive in char-
acter is not to indicate its legal effect. It is, rather, 'the beginning and not the end of the
analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms is concerned.'").
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ward the economically efficient outcome, and permits the party
with stronger bargaining power to appropriate more of the result-
ing surplus.9  The rule regarding arbitration of class actions
should favor economic efficiency in general, but not waste time
ensuring equality in each and every case.194
Business lawyers point out that when courts interpret man-
datory arbitration clauses to waive class action rights, they pro-
vide a strategic means for businesses to avoid class action suits
entirely. 95 This is a debatable assertion, and Professor Richard
Epstein has devoted substantial scholarship to arguing that the
principles of freedom of contract limit the ability of a more power-
ful party to take advantage of a weaker party during contractual
negotiations.'9 If a given transaction is not also beneficial to the
consumer, he will not engage in the transaction.'9 The fact that
the party offering the adhesion contract extracts a larger benefit
from the arrangement does not change this. Moreover, the class
mechanism cannot be used to regulate a party's use of negotiat-
ing power to extract more favorable (or even exploitative) con-
tractual provisions because the class mechanism is solely proce-
dural in nature.'94 The flaw in the consumer advocates' argument
lies with the fact that the Supreme Court has ruled that a party
may waive a procedural right unless waiver is specifically pre-
cluded by statute.19
The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that arbitration
panels are biased and "decline[d] to indulge the presumption that
the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be un-
" See Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947, 974
(1984) (discussing surplus allocation in employment contract negotiations).
' See, for example, Stillwater Leased Housing Associates v Kraus-Anderson Construc-
tion Co, 319 NW2d 424, 426-27 (Minn 1982) (overruling lower court decision to stay arbi-
tration proceedings pending resolution of non-arbitrable indemnification actions because,
while favorable in instant case, the stay would provide a party with an avenue through
which to avoid mandatory arbitration).
" See, for example, Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the
Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, Bus L Today 24 (May-June
1998) (discussing the use of binding arbitration clauses to defeat class actions); Dunham,
16 Franchise L J at 141-42 (cited in note 17) (arguing that franchisors should adopt arbi-
tration clauses to thwart class actions); Wilburn, Bus L Today at 57-58 (cited in note 16).
See Epstein, 51 U Chi L Rev at 954 (cited in note 193).
Compare id at 955 ("It is hardly plausible that contracts at will could be so perva-
sive in all businesses and at all levels if they did not serve the interests of employees as
well as employers.").
198 See Part II C.
' Mitsubishi, 473 US at 628 ("[Bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their reso-
lution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
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able or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impar-
tial arbitrators."2°° Although discovery procedures in an arbitral
setting might be less extensive than in the federal courts, a party
"trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the court-
room for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitra-
tion." °1 Further, the Court has stated that "even if the arbitration
could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [substantive law] pro-
vides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not
mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be
barred."2°  The Court instructed that a claim of unequal bargain-
ing power should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and that
"mere inequality in bargaining power .. . is not a sufficient rea-
son to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable." °O
A proponent of the hybrid system has expressed concern that,
if class-wide arbitration is barred, "plaintiffs who might have
reaped the benefits of class action litigation will lose that option
once arbitration of their claims is compelled."' °4 It is true that
plaintiffs who would have normally pursued claims as part of a
class would be forced to arbitrate claims individually, resulting in
an overall increase in the number of arbitration claims. However,
the judiciary would enjoy additional efficiency gains through re-
moval of these potential class action suits from the judicial forum.
It would be more accurate to focus instead on the present social
costs imposed by the explosion of class action litigation-largely
attributable to incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers to litigate and the
resultant misallocation of defendant resources through extortion
of unwarranted settlements. ° In the private arbitration setting,
a large corporate defendant would feel less pressure to settle un-
necessarily, as there is no risk of the negative media attention
incurred through public access to proceedings and to official court
records. Moreover, the substitution of a neutral arbitrator for a
potentially hyper-sympathetic jury may reduce the risk of exces-
sive damages awards.
, Id at 634.
,0, Id at 628.
. Gilmer, 500 US at 32, quoting Nicholson v CPC International Inc, 877 F2d 221, 241
(3d Cir 1989) (Becker dissenting).
... Id at 33.
Waltcher, 74 Cornell L Rev at 396 (cited in note 18).
205 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum L Rev 669, 672-73 (1986) (discussing negative economic effects of class litigation).
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Setting costs aside, plaintiffs would still have every incentive
to pursue claims with true merit. Moreover, an individual plain-
tiff would enjoy expedited resolution of his claim-one of the
greatest benefits of arbitration. When business efforts to elimi-
nate class action suits are viewed from this perspective, it is quite
likely that they more accurately serve to restore economic bal-
ance, rather than to exploit the already-victimized consumer.
In the wake of Green Tree,2w courts have begun to take steps
to ensure a plaintiff's access to remedy irrespective of cost. In
Green Tree, the Supreme Court revisited its earlier holding that a
claim may be arbitrated "so long as the prospective litigant effec-
tively may vindicate [her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum." 0 7 The Court recognized that arbitration costs "could pre-
clude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statu-
tory rights in the arbitral forum."'0 The Court held, however,
that the plaintiff has the burden of showing a likelihood of incur-
ring a prohibitively expensive financial burden. 09 In the event of
a successful showing, the court would invalidate the arbitration
clause and permit the plaintiff to pursue her claim in the judicial
210
arena.
Consumer advocates and commentators in favor of class-wide
arbitration argue that, for certain claims, the court filing fee itself
will exceed the damages sought.211 Thus, even though judicial re-
lief is available, the impracticality would prevent most plaintiffs
from pursuing legitimate claims.212 While this is a valid concern,
there are less extreme ways to ensure a plaintiff retains the op-
tion of pursuing an individual claim. For example, under the
20 531 US 79 (2000).
117 Green Tree, 531 US at 90, quoting Mitsubishi, 473 US at 637.
20 Id.
..9 Id at 92. In Green Tree, the Court held plaintiffs speculative estimation of costs to
be insufficient evidence. See id at 91 & n 6.
" Green Tree, 531 US at 92.
... See, for example, Melissa Briggs Hutchines, Commentary, At What Costs? When
Consumers Cannot Afford the Price of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 Ala L Rev 599, 606
(2002). For suggested work-around solutions for lawyers whose class claims are barred by
arbitration clauses, see Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad
Case of Two-Time Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, 10 BU
Pub Int L J 366, 411-13 (2001).
"' See Hutchines, 53 Ala L Rev at 606-07 (cited in note 211) (discussing Ex Parte Dan
Tucker Auto Sales, Inc, 718 So2d 33 (Ala 1998)). The Dan Tucker court upheld an arbitra-
tion agreement that adopted an AAA rule requiring the initiating party to pay fees. Id at
38. The plaintiff, who had a yearly income of $19,000, could not afford the fees, and was
thus unable to seek resolution of his claim. Id at 39.
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NYSE rule requiring arbitration of claims,213 it is standard prac-
tice for employers to pay all of the arbitrators' fees. 14 In addition,
some arbitrators have begun to waive fees prospectively for plain-
tiffs with small claims.2
Lower courts following Green Tree have developed similar
case law to preserve a plaintiff's ability to pursue claims. In
Mattox v Decision One Mortgage Co,216 the District of Massachu-
setts ordered arbitration in a suit brought by bank borrowers
against a mortgage company. 217 The court ruled that, because the
defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs' fees if not waived by the arbi-
trator, the defendant had eliminated the risk that plaintiffs
would not be able to prosecute their claims.218 The Fourth Circuit
has held that a contractual splitting of arbitration fees does not
render an arbitration clause per se unenforceable; instead, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that financial hardship "deterred
[him] from attempting to vindicate his rights by means of a full
and fair arbitration proceeding." 9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
found that where a plaintiff had an income "in excess of six fig-
ures," a fee-splitting arrangement did not create an obstacle to
pursuing his claim.22 ° Conversely, when a plaintiff's income is suf-
ficiently small, at least one court has ordered the claim to arbi-
tration but required the defendant to pay the arbitration costs
and filing fee.2 While this case law is admittedly in the early
stages of development, these types of judicial solutions should
satisfy scholars concerned with protecting plaintiffs' ability to
pursue their claims. This type of judicial and arbitral protection
is the best way to simultaneously respect the strengths of the ar-
bitration tool and ensure resolution of valid claims.
..3 NYSE Rule 600.
"' Cole v Burns International Security Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1483 (DC Cir 1997).
See also Rosenberg v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 170 F3d 1, 16 (1st Cir
1999) (noting that under NYSE rules, a plaintiff is unlikely to bear forum fees).
2' See, for example, Sleeper Farms v Agway, Inc, 211 F Supp 2d 197, 203 (D Me 2002)
("[Ilt appears that fees in this case have been waived by the arbitrator."); Green Tree, 531
US at 91 n 6 ("[P]etitioners' counsel states that arbitration fees are frequently waived.").
2002 US Dist LEXIS 18066 (D Mass).
27 Id at *1-2.
... Id at *10.
29 Bradford v Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc, 238 F3d 549, 558 (4th Cir 2001).
21* Williams v Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc, 197 F3d 752, 765 (5th Cir 2000).
"' Giordano v Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 5433, *24-25
(E D Pa). The court assigned costs to the defendant despite a contractual arbitration
clause providing for fee splitting. Id at *5-6.
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In Lewis v Prudential Bache Securities, Inc,222 a California
Court of Appeals concluded that class-wide arbitration was
proper because the arbitration of individual claims "probably
[could not] justify the time and money required to prove
[them]. "223 Likewise, a Pennsylvania Superior Court cursorily ac-
cepted the Dickler Group's assertion that "if each Shearson cus-
tomer was relegated only to individually proceeding in arbitra-
tion, the costs involved would effectively bar most, if not all, from
obtaining the relief to which they are entitled and which this
class action seeks to achieve."224 In light of Green Tree and the
recent trends toward fee shifting or waiver, California and Penn-
sylvania should reverse their stances on class-wide arbitration
and instead order plaintiffs to individually arbitrate their claims.
A consumer advocate might suggest that a waiver of class
actions creates grotesque incentives for defendants to cause inef-
ficient harm to consumers, especially when the harm is spread
out so thinly that an individual plaintiff would not have much of
an incentive to bring suit. Such plaintiffs essentially would then
be left without an avenue of recourse. There are several potential
solutions to this problem. First, a putative class could call a de-
fendant's bluff by initiating a multitude of arbitration claims.
While each plaintiff would bear only the costs of a single arbitra-
tion, the business would be forced to pay separate fees for each
arbitrated claim (and may actually pay double for each claim, if
in a jurisdiction or under rules that shift arbitration costs). Law-
yers will have incentives to pursue arbitration of claims that
permit the awarding of attorneys' fees. Likewise, a consumer ad-
vocacy group might volunteer to pay plaintiffs' arbitration fees in
an effort to effect systemic change. If defendants incur signifi-
cantly onerous arbitration costs, they may begin to specifically
exclude class actions from arbitration clauses-thus reinstating a
plaintiffs procedural right to seek a class remedy.
Alternatively, if the instances of low-value harm to consum-
ers significantly increase as a result of the preclusion of class pro-
ceedings, Congress could amend the FAA. An explicit congres-
sional mandate would be a true panacea to consumer ills, and,
unlike class-wide arbitration, would neither compromise nor di-
minish the important benefits gained through arbitration. This
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's expressed reluc-
... 225 Cal Rptr 69 (Cal App 1986).
23 Id at 75.
... Dickler, 596 A2d at 864 (quoting plaintiffs original brief).
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tance to adopt solutions "by judicial decision rather than amenda-
tory legislation." While consumer losses would likely have to
reach a significant magnitude to spur congressional action, con-
sumer advocates should find solace in the fact that individual
consumer losses would be small. A few dollars of harm per capita
is a small price to pay for a complete, workable solution that
maintains the integrity of the arbitration system.
CONCLUSION
At the heart of the incompatibility between class actions and
arbitration provisions lies a struggle for freedom of contract. The
Supreme Court has laid out very clear rules with respect to in-
terpreting arbitration provisions: the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration may not supersede a party's freedom of contract, and
courts may not read a contractual provision (including an arbitra-
tion provision) beyond the intention of the parties. Strictly speak-
ing, an arbitration provision submitting "a controversy" to arbi-
tration could be construed to include class action suits. Supreme
Court precedent, however, clearly states that a court may not
read into a contract any additional meaning, but must enforce the
contract as written. Accordingly, most courts have declined to
order class-wide arbitration. Arbitration provisions reflect a con-
tractual agreement between the two signatories, and privity does
not extend to third parties, even if those parties are similarly
situated. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which confer pro-
cedural authority over class actions and are meant to fill the gaps
of the FAA, do not confer substantive judicial authority in excess
of what the parties contracted for. In addition, the purpose of the
FAA-to promote efficient and cost-effective dispute resolution-
is not furthered by class-wide arbitration.
With evolving arbitral rules and judicial holdings in the wake
of Green Tree, consumer advocates may rest assured that puta-
tive class plaintiffs will not be left without a remedy. As such, it
is time for California and Pennsylvania to reject the hybrid solu-
tion. Statutes providing for lawyers' fees and arbitral/judicial or
contractual fee-shifting provisions will ensure that even plaintiffs
with small claims are able to secure representation and pursue
claims in the arbitral setting. In the meantime, consumers and
plaintiffs' lawyers should engage in creative tactics in an attempt
to alter defendants' business behavior.
" Gulf Oil Corp v Copp Paving Co, 419 US 186, 202 (US 1974).
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